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Abstract: Economics in One Lesson is the best introduction to economics ever written. It has enticed, educated, 
and inspired multitudes of people to embrace the teachings of the dismal science. To the extent that if there 
is any understanding of economics by the general public, it is due more to this book than to any other. Yet, I 
have uncovered one error in it, which I attempt to rectify, offering a very slightly improvement to a priceless 
book on economics. 
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Nota sobre un error en la obra La economía en una lección
Resumen: La economía en una lección es la mejor introducción a la economía que alguna vez se ha redactado. 
Ha atraído, educado e inspirado a multitudes de personas a abrazar las enseñanzas de la ciencia sombría. En 
la medida en que haya una comprensión de la economía por parte del público en general, esto se debe más a 
este libro que a cualquier otro. Sin embargo, he descubierto un error en él, cuya rectificación es mi intento de 
mejorar muy levemente un libro invaluable sobre economía.
Palabras clave: Elasticidad, precios de paridad, costos, ganancias.
Nota sobre um erro na obra Economia em uma única lição
Resumo: Economia em uma única lição é a melhor introdução à economia que já foi escrita. Atraiu, educou 
e inspirou milhares de pessoas a adotar os ensinamentos da ciência sombria. Na medida em que existe uma 
compreensão da economia por parte do público em geral, isso se deve mais a esse livro do que a qualquer 
outro. No entanto, descobri um erro nele, cuja retificação é minha tentativa de melhorar, levemente, um livro 
inestimável sobre economia
Palavras-chave: Elasticidade, paridade de preços, custos, lucros.
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Introduction1
I owe my career in economics to Hazlitt (1946).2 I use this book in my introduction to 
microeconomics classes, and I am very grateful to its author for writing it. Economics in One 
Lesson is, in my opinion, the very best introduction to economics, bar none, ever written.
Why, then, besmirch this magnificent publication with criticism? There are several 
justifications for such an unseemly initiative. First, “you can’t have too much of the truth.” 
Truth is its own reward. Truth is the byword of our profession, and, indeed, of every profession 
worthy of its name. If we do not attempt to wield the “terrible swift sword” of truth wherever 
it leads us, without fear or favor, we are not worthy of the honorific, “economists.” Second, 
from a pragmatic point of view, better that I, a strong supporter of this book3 call into question 
one erroneous point made by Hazlitt, in order to very slightly improve the book, than to have 
a critic of this author’s philosophy do so, in an attempt to discredit it. Thus, a benefit of the 
present criticism is that it might obviate one made with very different motives than those of 
its author.
First, the background (1946, p. 91):
The argument for parity prices ran roughly like this. Agriculture is the most basic and 
important of all industries. It must be preserved at all costs. Moreover, the prosperity of 
everybody else depends upon the prosperity of the farmer. If he does not have the purchasing 
power to buy the products of industry, industry languishes. This was the cause of the 
1929 collapse, or at least of our failure to recover from it. For the prices of farm products 
dropped violently, while the prices of industrial products dropped very little. The result 
was that the farmer could not buy industrial products; the city workers were laid off and 
could not buy farm products, and the depression spread in ever-widening vicious circles. 
There was only one cure, and it was simple. Bring back the prices of the farmer’s products 
to a parity with the prices of the things the farmer buys. This parity existed in the period 
from 1909 to 1914, when farmers were prosperous. That price relationship must be restored 
and preserved perpetually.
What, then, is the problematic passage? It occurs as a part of (HAZLITT, 2008, p. 95) 
rejection of “parity prices”: “… when the farmer reduces the production of wheat to get parity, 
he may indeed get a higher price for each bushel, but he produces and sells fewer bushels. 
The result is that his income does not go up in proportion to his prices”.
When price rises and quantity falls, what happens to total revenue? It all depends upon 
the elasticity of the demand curve between those two points; e.g., the lower the price and 
the higher the quantity with which we begin, the higher price and lower quantity at which 
point we end. If the demand curve is inelastic, the farmers’ total revenue rises; if unitary, 
1 The author thanks a referee of MISES Journal for helpful suggestions, which greatly improved the present 
paper. The usual caveats of course apply.
2 All references to this author, unless otherwise specified, will be to this particular publication.
3 A vast understatement.
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then it remains the same; and if elastic, then it falls, as we move up and to the left along the 
demand curve4. 
Suppose the former. We posit, then, that the demand curve is inelastic5 at its relevant 
section. That means the revenue accruing to the farmers rises. Does that logically imply that 
“his income does not go up in proportion to his prices?” Not necessarily. Hazlitt does not 
take cognizance of the fact that, when quantity falls, so do costs. This is true, to be sure, not 
if he burns his crops. Then, costs do not fall; they even rise, since setting them on fire is not a 
costless activity. However, if he does not plant these crops in the first place, he saves on land 
rent,6 fertilizer, seeds, and power for his tractor etc. Thus, his costs decrease. Then, given the 
cost concatenations, it is possible that the farm income “go up in more than proportion to his 
prices”, contrary to Hazlitt’s statement
Let us consider some numerical examples. We will illustrate this point in three ways. 
First, with a demand curve that is elastic within the bounds we are considering; second, with 
one that is inelastic; and; third, with one of unitary elasticity.
1. Elastic case
Suppose price rises from 10 to 11, an increase of 10%, while quantity falls from 100 to 
90. Total revenue falls from $1000 to $990, and the elasticity between these two points on 
the demand curve is 21/19, or elastic. In order to have a rise of more than 10% in income, we 
must go not from $1000 to $990, but from $1000 to $1100 or more. This would require a cost 
saving from the decrease in production of anything more than $110. Posit that the cost saving 
is $120, when quantity decreases from 100 to 90. Then, revenue will increase from $1000 to 
$1110, a rise of more than 10%. For costs to decrease by $120 when quantity decreases by 10 
units (from 100 units to 90 units) the average cost per unit must decrease by $10; i.e., $12/unit. 
However, if the original price was $10 per unit, the original cost must have been no more 
than $10/unit, assuming a viable enterprise. So, even if the firm were operating at breakeven 
originally and it raised its price to $11/unit, cost must have dropped from $10/unit to -$2/unit 
for this scenario to work. 
Is this logically possible? Yes. Anything that does not constitute a logical contradiction is 
possible, and this scenario does not constitute a logical contradiction. Is it plausible? Certainly 
not, under the assumption of a “viable enterprise.” But not all enterprises are viable. In the 
real world, which we presume is the one which Hazlitt addresses, there are always some 
firms making a profit, others breaking even, and others yet undergoing losses. Since we are 
4 I say all this arguendo, given Barnett and Block (2010).
5 This assumption flies in the face of standard microeconomic theory. No firm would knowingly operate where 
demand is inelastic. Thus, if the firm is operating in the elastic range, an increase in price reduces revenue. 
“Knowingly” is the key word here. Of course “No firm would knowingly operate where demand is inelastic.” 
But, in the real world, firms do this unknowingly. And a full analysis of the economic situation of the world 
requires that we do not ignore this sector of the economy.
6 Or the opportunity costs thereof.
Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | letra1@editoraletra1.com.br
Walter Block
MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, São Paulo, 2020; 8 | e202081258
now discussing agriculture, the latter is more likely than in other industries.7 It is beyond the 
scope of the present paper to speculate on any such statistics; all we can say for sure is that for 
some farmers, this numerical example is likely. Hazlitt warns against (1946, p. 15-16, [emphasis 
added by the author]) “… the persistent tendency of men to see only the immediate effects of 
a given policy, or its effects only on a special group, and to neglect to inquire what the long-run 
effects8 of that policy will be not only on that special group, but on all groups. Farmers who 
are losing money are a “special group” that we choose not to ignore.
2. Inelastic case9
Suppose price rises from 10 to 20, an increase of 100%, while quantity falls from 100 to 
90. Total revenue increases from $1000 to $1800, and the elasticity between these two points on 
the demand curve is 3/19, or inelastic. In order to have a rise of more than 100% in income, or 
a doubling, we must go not from $1000 to $1800, but from $1000 to $2000 or more. This would 
require a cost saving from the decrease in production of anything more than $200. Posit that 
the cost saving is $300, when quantity decreases from 100 to 90. Then, revenue will more than 
double from $1000 to $2100, a rise of more than 100%. In this case MR = +800/-10 = -80 (per 
unit). Profit maximization (in this case, loss minimization) would require MC = -$80/unit. This 
implies a cost saving of $20/unit when price starts at $10/unit. Again, if we are analyzing the 
situation of profit earning farmers, or of those breaking even, this scenario must be rejected. 
However, as Shakespeare informs us: “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
7 The number of farming firms and the labor force participation in farming has been undergoing a long 
term downward trend. See on this AP (1988); U.S Census Bureau (2014; 2019). According to one source: “In 
the 1800s, 90 percent of the population lived on farms; today it is around one percent.” Source: https://www.
google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&ei=w13UXdKeLImWsQX2-YaQBw&q=+farm+population+historical&o
q=+farm+population+historical&gs_l=psy-ab.3...4546.4546..6673...0.2..0.84.84.1......0....1..gws-wiz.......0i71.S-0drB-
rvqA&ved=0ahUKEwiSjO-dm_flAhUJS6wKHfa8AXIQ4dUDCAo&uact=5. Acessed: Jul 1 2019.
8 Elasticities tend to be higher the greater the length of run. That is, there is more a response in quantity to price 
changes, the more time firms are given to adjust. In the immediate run, quantity is all but fixed, since little 
or nothing can be changed with notice of only a few seconds, or even minutes. But as more and more time is 
allowed, businesses become more flexible. It is not for nothing that major league pitchers hurl the ball toward 
the batter at speeds of 80 miles per hour or more. They do not want to give the batter time to adjust. When 
they pitch warmup to their own teammates before the game, the ball comes in at 40 miles per hour or so, and 
can usually be hit out of the park.
9 In the view of mainstream economics, in perfectly competitive markets, we can have equilibrium in the 
inelastic part of demand curve, although each firm sees it as perfectly inelastic. In contrast, a monopolist, or 
a cartel that successfully lobbies for restrictions, will not operate in inelastic part of demand curve, for both 
revenues increases and costs decreases – and the cartel would reduce the quantity/increase the price. Austrian 
economists take a very different view of this matter. For the praxeological school, the important distinction 
is not between number of sellers (one or a few, monopoly, oligopoly; many, perfect competition), but rather 
whether or not there is freedom of entry (laissez faire capitalism), or restrictions on entry (crony capitalism 
or economic fascism). For more on this see Anderson et. al (2001); Armentano (1972; 1982; 1989; 1999), Barnett, 
et. al. (2005; 2007), Block (1977; 1982; 1994), Block and Barnett (2009); Boudreaux and DiLorenzo (1992); Costea 
(2003), DiLorenzo (1996; 1999; 1985), DiLorenzo and High (1988), Henderson (2013), High (1984; 1985), Hull 
(2005), McChesney (1991) McGee (1958), Rothbard (2004), Shugart (1987), Smith (1983), Tucker (1998a; 1998b).
Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | letra1@editoraletra1.com.br
NOTE ON AN ERROR IN HAZLITT’S ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON
MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, São Paulo, 2020; 8 | e202081258
than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” In our philosophy, there are also tillers of the soil 
who undergo losses.
3. Unitary elasticity10
Suppose price rises from 10 to 11, an increase of 10%, while quantity falls from 11 to 10. 
Total revenue remains at $110, and the elasticity between these two points on the demand 
curve is 1, or elastic. In order to have a rise of more than 10% in income, we must go not from 
$110 to $120, but from $110 to $121 or more. This would require a cost saving from the decrease 
in production of anything more than $11. Posit that the cost saving is $12, when quantity 
decreases from 11 to 10. Then, revenue will rise from $110 to $122, an increase of more than 
10%. To be sure, a cost a saving of $12 for a one unit decrease in sales with an original price of 
$10/unit means operating at a loss, and then having negative marginal cost. As we have seen, 
however, there is nothing implausible, let alone impossible, about such situation.
This error is no big deal. It is almost, but not quite, comparable to a typographical error. 
One would imagine that were Hazlitt to read this note, he would quickly acquiesce in the 
notion that if the cost savings of producing were sufficient, then, yes, the farmers’ income 
could indeed rise more than in proportion to the price increase.
Nor is this error based on fallacious considerations such as the Giffen Good11. Here, 
there is nothing as untoward. It is just a simple failure to note that with a lower quantity, it is 
entirely possible that the costs of production will fall, and by an amount large enough so as 
to render Hazlitt’s conclusion untrue.
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